Several legitimate Windows applications unfortunately have the same JA3 hashes, so we can't use them to uniquely identify the IcedID agents. Image: NetworkMiner's Parameters tab with keyword filter "JA3 Hash" The JA3 hashes used by the IcedID malware agent can be found in NetworkMiner's Hosts tab as well as in the Parameters tab. The X.509 certificate was created using OpenSSL's default values, such as "Internet Widgits Pty Ltd" etc.įurther details about this certificate can be found on It turns out that all these sites used the same self-signed certificate, which had SHA1 fingerprint 452e969c51882628dac65e38aff0f8e5ebee6e6b. NetworkMiner has extracted the X.509 certificates for vaccnavalcod.website, mazzappa.fun, ameripermanentno.website and odichaly.space to disk as "localhost.cer". What we can do, however, is to extract the HTTPS server's X.509 certificate and the JA3 hash of the client's TLS implementation from the encrypted traffic. The traffic to 83.97.20.176 is encrypted, so we can't inspect the payload to verify whether or not it is IcedID C2 communications. Image: CapLoader's Services tab showing that the IcedID malware agent connects to the C2 server every 5 minutes (00:05:01). Where the malware agent connects back to the C2 server on regular intervals to check for new tasks. Periodic connection patterns like this is a typical indicator of C2 traffic, That host is most likely a command-and-control (C2) server used by the IcedID malware.ĬapLoader's "Services" tab also reveals that the TLS connections to port 443 on 83.97.20.176 are very periodic, Vaccnavalcod.website, mazzappa.fun, ameripermanentno.website and odichaly.space,Īll of which resolved to IP 83.97.20.176. Right after the IcedID download we see a series of HTTPS connections towards odd domains like This turns out to be an encrypted IcedID DLL file, which has been analyzed by
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